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Abstract. What are the relevant values to the appraisal of research programs? This question remains hotly 
debated, as philosophers have recently proposed many lists of values potentially relevant to scientific appraisal. 
Surprisingly, despite being mentioned in many lists, little attention has been paid to fruitfulness. It is unclear 
how fruitfulness should be explicated, and whether it has any substantial role in scientific appraisal. In this 
paper, I argue we should explicate fruitfulness as the capacity to develop of research programs. Moreover, I 
provide a novel strategy to assess and compare the fruitfulness of programs focused on their research questions 
and heuristics. To illustrate how this strategy would work, I will discuss a case study, namely the adaptationist 
program in evolutionary psychology.
1. Introduction
Thomas  Kuhn (1977) suggested  a  list  of  five values  that,  among others,  have  an actual,
beneficial  role  in  scientific  appraisal.  This  list  includes  accuracy,  consistency,  scope,
simplicity, and fruitfulness. Philosophers have then proposed several lists that include these
classical values (e.g.  McMullin 1983; Douglas 2009).  Nonetheless,  there is not a general
consensus about the definitions and roles of these values. While many papers have shed light
on some of these values, such as simplicity (e.g. Forster & Sober 1994; Baker 2003), little
attention has been paid to other values, such as fruitfulness. Few studies have addressed the
explication of fruitfulness as a value relevant to assess and compare rival research programs.
Much of  the  literature  provides  definitions  that  are  too vague for  providing strategies  to
assess the fruitfulness of programs. A good illustration of this problem is Kuhn's account of
fruitfulness. Despite ascribing a prominent role to fruitfulness in theory choice, he spent a
very few words on it.  When defining it,  he just states that fruitful theories “disclose new
phenomena or previously unnoted relationships among those already known” (1977, 322).
Moreover,  there  is  considerable  disagreement  over  its  importance  in  theory  assessment.
While  some philosophers  argue  that  fruitfulness  is  a  crucial  value  for  the  assessment  of
programs (McMullin 1976; Kuhn 1977), others claim that it plays a secondary role in theory
appraisal  (Nolan  1999;  Douglas  2009).  For  instance,  Hugh  Lacey  (1999)  argues  that
fruitfulness should not be included in the list of values that are relevant for assessing theories
and  programs.  According  to  Lacey,  fruitfulness  “pertains  more  to  such  stances  as  the
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provisional entrainment of theories rather than to their acceptance” (1999, 60). Fruitfulness
has also been criticized as having a noxious influence on science.  Helen Longino (1995)
criticizes the Kuhnian notion of fruitfulness because it focuses on the development of the
content of theories in response to puzzles that have to be solved. Instead, the development of
a program should be assessed as valuable, Longino argues, if it  “can be used to improve
living conditions in a way that reduces inequalities of power” (1995 394).1
Overall,  despite being frequently mentioned by philosophers and scientists,  how to
understand  fruitfulness  remains  obscure.  A satisfactory  explication  should  help  articulate
concrete  strategies  for  assessing  and  comparing  the  fruitfulness  of  research  programs.  It
should then answer at least two questions: What is fruitfulness? What are reliable strategies
for assessing and comparing the fruitfulness of rival research programs in science? The aims
of this paper are to provide an explication of fruitfulness and a strategy to assess it.
Despite  being  vague,  the  literature  on  fruitfulness  provides  useful  insights  for
developing an in-depth study. Indeed, many of the accounts suggested so far share the core
idea  that  fruitfulness  would  concern  the  desirable development  involving  changes,
extensions, and improvements of research programs' content. In this view, fruitful programs
can produce epistemic goods. I argue that in order to provide a satisfactory explication of
fruitfulness this core idea should be maintained and developed further. In particular, I suggest
assessing fruitfulness by taking into account the  set  of tools that makes the development
possible. This set is what scientists can employ for developing the content of the program.
These are the tools for formulating and testing hypotheses, such as experiments and methods
to analyse data. I argue that focusing on two of these tools, namely the research questions and
discovery  heuristics,  provides  us  with  a  concrete,  simple  strategy  for  evaluating  and
comparing  the  fruitfulness  of  research  programs.  Considering  research  questions  and
discovery heuristics constitutes a novel approach to fruitfulness. To date, the literature has
failed to recognize these factors as key elements for the assessment of fruitfulness.
This paper is structured as follows. In the second section, I consider the literature on
fruitfulness  and I  illustrate  the  aforementioned core  idea  as  presented  by Thomas  Kuhn,
Ernan McMullin, Daniel Nolan, and Samuel Schindler. Furthermore, I outline my approach to
assess fruitfulness, which is focused on research questions and discovery heuristics. In the
third  section,  I  introduce  a  case  study,  i.e.,  the  adaptationist  program  in  evolutionary
psychology. This case study shows how considering questions and heuristics can clarify and
1 Longino also suggests replacing fruitfulness with two alternative values, namely applicability to current 
human needs and diffusion of power (1995, 389).
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simplify the assessment of fruitfulness of research programs. In the fourth section, I draw
conclusions.
2. What Is Fruitfulness?
Scientists frequently refer to fruitfulness as an important feature of research programs.2 Max
Planck  talks  about  the  fruitfulness  of  explaining  entropy  by referring  to  the  probability
calculus   in  physics  (1915,  35).  Henri  Poincarè  praises  the  fruitfulness  of  mathematical
reasoning (1905, xix). The evolutionary psychologist David Buss stresses how research on
sex differences has become more fruitful by focusing on (internal) psychological mechanisms
rather than on (external) manifest behaviours (1998, 22). In particular, Buss claims that this
shift was fruitful because it led to the formulation of several hypotheses and the discovery of
many  sexual  differences.  Stephen  Gould,  instead,  criticizes  evolutionary  psychology  as
fruitless. He claims: “Evolutionary psychology could, in my view, become a fruitful science
by replacing its current penchant for narrow, and often barren, speculation with respect for
the pluralistic range of available alternatives” (1997). There are many similar examples that
could be cited. However, the pervasiveness of fruitfulness in scientific papers is not mirrored
in  the  philosophical  literature.  Relatively  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  explicating
fruitfulness and its role in theory appraisal. One of the consequences of the lack of a clear
explication is that  fruitfulness can be virtually ascribed to many different programs, even
rival ones. The fact that we can ascribe fruitfulness to rival programs does not constitute a
problem. Indeed, two rival programs can be both fruitful, just as they can be both simple or
internally consistent. However, the problem with fruitfulness is that it can be easily ascribed
to many programs because its  definition is  loose and no clear strategy for assessing it  is
provided.3 As the above examples of Buss and Gould show, scientists may radically disagree
whether a program is fruitful or not. This may depend on the divergent ideas that scientists
entertain about the merits of a research program. However, in the next sections I argue that
such disputes may be fostered by a vague definition of fruitfulness and that it is possible to
shed light on them by appealing to a clear account of fruitfulness.
2 Talking about “research programs” recalls Imre Lakatos' philosophy. However, I am not committed to the 
specific aspects of the Lakatosian notion of research program, such as hard-core and protective belt. I 
construe a research program as a set of theories that share some fundamental assumption and methodologies.
3 This problem affects many values. As mentioned in the introduction, several papers discuss how to best 
define simplicity (e.g.  Forster & Sober 1994; Baker 2003). It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the
problems arising from the vague definitions of other values.
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In the following pages, I explicate a notion of fruitfulness understood as a capacity to
develop  of  programs.  However,  before  doing  that,  in  the  next  subsection  I  discuss  the
accounts suggested by Thomas Kuhn, Ernan McMullin, Daniel Nolan, and Samuel Schindler.
While Kuhn and McMullin provide two of the earliest attempts to explicate fruitfulness, the
accounts of Nolan and Schindler are two of the rare recent analyses of fruitfulness.
2.1 Fruitfulness as desirable development of programs
Thomas Kuhn includes fruitfulness in his pioneering list of values (1977). Although he claims
that fruitfulness is “of special importance to actual scientific decisions” (1977, 322), he spent
a very few words on this value. Nonetheless, from the little he says, it is clear that he construe
fruitful programs as producing new research findings and disclosing “new phenomena or
previously unnoted relationships among those already known” (ibid.). In particular, fruitful
programs  produce  new findings  and  discoveries  that  help  to  reach  solutions  to  research
puzzles. For instance, Kuhn claims that the adoption of mechanico-corpuscolar explanations
in different programs made them fruitful since it led to the solutions of “problems that had
defied generally accepted solution and suggesting others to replace them” (1962, 104).
Fruitfulness plays a crucial role in the Kuhnian picture of theory choice, influencing
scientists' decision leading to transitions from old paradigms to new paradigms.4 Paradigms
are, in Kuhn's view, puzzle-solving exemplars, determining the rules for solving puzzles and
what counts as an acceptable solution (1962, 38). When a paradigm and its rules persistently
fail to solve puzzles, other paradigms and new rules emerge and scientists become interested
in  these  other  programs.  Hence,  the  power  of  solving  puzzles,  i.e.  the  fruitfulness  of
programs, is one of the main reasons that convince scientists to work with a paradigm.
Kuhn's ideas have influenced other philosophers'  understanding of fruitfulness. For
instance, Ernan McMullin elaborates the idea of fruitfulness as the power of programs to
develop and solve puzzles and anomalies. Indeed, in his view “a fertile theory is one with the
capacity to grow and change” (1976, 60) by finding solutions to puzzle and anomalies.5 Such
a capacity is a diachronic virtue of programs, i.e., it manifests itself over the course of time
(McMullin 2009, 505). To account for this time-dependent aspect, McMullin proposes two
kinds of fruitfulness, namely proven fertility and untested fertility. While proven fertility is
past oriented and it concerns the past success of a program in growing and changing, untested
4 While Kuhn mentions theories and paradigms in his analysis of fruitfulness, I talk about programs. Although
these are not synonyms, their differences do not constitute a problem for my analysis of fruitfulness. 
5 McMullin employs the term “fertility” to refer to the virtue discussed in this paper. In the literature, 
philosophers also use “fecundity” (Quine 1955) and “boldness” (Colyvan 1999).
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fertility is future oriented and refers to the potential ability to develop in the future (1976,
400). McMullin does not ascribe equal importance to the two kinds of fruitfulness. Indeed, he
argues that while proven fertility is a truth indicative feature of programs, untested fertility is
not and, because of this, focuses his analysis on proven fertility.6 
McMullin explicates fruitfulness as follows:
“The [fruitful] theory proves able to make novel predictions that were not part of the set
of  original  explananda.  More  important,  the  theory  proves  to  have  the  imaginative
resources, functioning here rather as a metaphor might in literature, to enable anomalies
to be overcome and new and powerful extensions to be made. Here it is the long-term
proven  ability  of  the  theory  or  research  program  to  generate  fruitful  additions  and
modifications that has to be taken into account.” (McMullin 1983, 16)
In this view, fruitful programs have the adequate instruments to promote the flowering of new
ideas and extensions.  They stimulate  the creative imagination of  scientists  to  modify the
content  of  programs in desirable  ways  (McMullin  1979,  60).  As Segall  explains,  fruitful
programs possess metaphorical suggestiveness: just like good metaphors, fruitful programs
suggest creative ideas to improve our understanding or knowledge of the world (Segall 2009,
58).  However,  being fruitful does not mean encouraging mere change. A type of change,
McMullin argues, is of special importance. He suggests focusing on the modifications of a
program  occurring  when  it  has  to  deal  with  anomalies,  which  he  calls  non-ad  hoc
accommodations. These modifications are valuable since they involve adjustments that do not
modify the fundamental ideas of the program (McMullin 1985, 264). By way of illustration,
McMullin discusses the discovery of the electron spin in the Bohr model. Scientists were not
able to explain some anomalies, i.e.,  the reaction of hydrogen to a strong magnetic field.
Then,  such  anomalies  were  successfully  accommodated  by  postulating  electron  spin.
McMullin claims:
“Electron spin was not part of the original Bohr model. Its omission was not a formal
idealization,  strictly  speaking,  because  there  was  no  reason  to  suppose  the  electron
would possess spin. 'Has the electron spin?' was a question that simply had not been
asked, and that could not be answered within the original model. But it was a question
that at some point could easily enough suggest a fruitful line to follow.” (1985, 263-4)
For McMullin,  this accommodation was inspired by the theory itself  and it harmoniously
fitted with the program in its original formulation. The intrinsic creative suggestiveness of the
6 The focus on proven fertility was dictated by McMullin's purpose of  employing fruitfulness to defend 
scientific realism (1979). 
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program produced this adjustment. This ability to suggest modifications, McMullin argues, is
a truth indicative virtue of programs, i.e., it reveals that the content of the program is true or
approximately true. That is, the ability of a program to survive to anomalies by means of
changes that extend and improve its content reveals that the program gets something right
about the real structure of the world.7
Daniel Nolan criticizes McMullin's account of fruitfulness. Specifically, he claims that
proven fertility can be reduced to other values and untested fertility's importance is parasitic
on the importance of other values.  Indeed, a program has proven fertility if  it  is  able to
confirm itself  through  changes  and  this,  Nolan  argues,  is  a  facet  of  the  value  of  novel
confirmation (1999, 271). On the other hand, he construes untested fertility as the chance that
a future version of a program will perform better in fulfilling some virtues than its current
version,  such  as  strength  and  predictive  power  (ibid.).  Still,  despite  being  a  dismissive,
reductionist account, Nolan’s portrayal shares the core idea of fruitfulness as the power of
programs  to  develop  with  Kuhn  and  McMullin'  accounts.  Kuhn  and  McMullin  construe
fruitfulness  as  an  ability  of  programs  to  develop  by  finding  solutions  to  puzzles  and
anomalies. Nolan’s account, instead, focuses on the desirable development involved in novel
confirmation and fulfilling certain virtues in the future. 
More  recently,  McMullin's  analysis  of  fruitfulness  has  been  criticized  by  Samuel
Schindler (2017). In particular, Schindler argues that the discovery of the electron spin is not
a genuine case of non-ad hoc accommodation (2017, 168). Although Schindler criticizes this
historical case study, he claims that McMullin's notion of fruitfulness should be developed
further. In particular, the relation between fruitfulness and non-ad hocness should be studied
since, Schindlers argues, non-ad hocness clearly is an important virtue of programs (2017,
170). 
Nolan and Schindler provide the most recent accounts of fruitfulness. Although many
recent studies have analysed the role of values in scientific practice (e.g. Douglas 2009; Steel
2010), they have largely ignored the literature on fruitfulness. In the next section, I develop
the core idea of these accounts to provide an explication of fruitfulness and a strategy to
assess programs.
2.2 Developing the notion of fruitfulness
7 Recently, Schindler (2017) has pointed out that the non-ad hoc modifications analysed by McMullin are akin
to Imre Lakatos’ positive heuristic (Lakatos 1970). They both involve adjustments that do not seriously alter 
what Lakatos calls the “hard core” of the program, but they are able to extend its content. Schindler calls 
these modifications “de-idealisations of the theory” (2017, 156).
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Let's define fruitfulness as  an ability of research programs to develop. A program develops
when  it  enhances  our  knowledge  or  understanding  of  the  world.  In  particular,  fruitful
programs develop by producing  epistemic goods, such as novel hypotheses. Now, how can
we assess this capacity to be productive? What are the relevant aspects for evaluating the
productivity of programs? To answer these questions, I suggest focusing on the set of tools of
research programs. This is what the researchers can use to extend and improve the content of
a research program. Not any extension of the content counts as an improvement. For instance,
making the content broader by formulating many implausible hypotheses does not make the
program developing.  The  quality of  the  hypotheses  generated should also  be considered.
Specifically, I suggest analysing two tools that scientists employ to extend programs' content,
i.e., research questions and discovery heuristics. These components are used to organize and
plan research and to formulate novel hypotheses. They guide and constrain – together with
other components – the development of research programs. Both the kinds of questions and
heuristics  and  the  ways  in  which  they  are  employed  are  relevant  factors  to  analyse  for
assessing the fruitfulness of programs.
Consider  research questions  first.  Several  studies  have explored the importance of
questions in the process of extending our knowledge (e.g. van Fraassen 1980; Mason 2002).
For  instance,  some  philosophers  suggest  understanding  science  as  a  question-answering
process  (Hintikka  1981).  The  questions  we  ask  show  what  we  find  worthy  of  being
investigated  or  what  we  think  as  a  useful  starting  point  for  extending  our  knowledge.
Examples of research questions are:
(a) What is the evolutionary function of jealousy for human beings?
(b) Is there a link between flu vaccine and miscarriage?
Now,  why  are  research  questions  particularly  relevant  for  assessing  the  fruitfulness of
research programs? 
Research questions constitute the starting point of the enquiry and, as Sven Lundstedt
points out, “initial scientific questions, like first impressions, carry a great deal of weight in
shaping the direction of a system of thought” (1968, 229). The research questions posed and
the answers that they allow as appropriate significantly affect the development of research
programs: questions can either promote or compromise the fruitfulness of programs. 
Research questions have an important role in determining the methods used to conduct
the research, which sizes of samples are legitimate, and what count as relevant data (Mason
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2002,  19).8 The  choice  of  research  questions  depends  on  several  factors,  such  as  the
background  assumptions endorsed  by  the  scientists  or  scientific  community.  These
assumptions can be of different sorts,  e.g.  moral,  political,  and methodological,  and their
importance can vary across contexts. For instance, question (b) may be the result of some
moral assumptions, such as the idea that protecting human health is a moral duty and our
research should then be focused on preventing damages caused by medicines. Such a moral
concern may play little or no role in determining the question over the function of jealousy.
Analysing  research  questions  can  provide  us  with  relevant  information  about  the
research conducted. Specifically, research questions have at least three dimensions that can be
explored. First, examining a research question makes it possible to understand the  focus of
the research, i.e., the portion of the world that scientists want to investigate. Question (a)
makes clear that human beings and their psychological traits are the phenomena on which the
research  primarily  focuses.  Second,  research  questions  show the  aims of  the  study.  For
instance, question (b) makes clear that the goal of such an investigation is gaining knowledge
on the possible harms caused by some vaccines. Finally, by analysing research questions we
can  understand  the  orientation of  the  enquiry.  Namely,  research  questions  provide  the
direction of the investigation, i.e., the track along which the research can develop. Questions
guide  the  choice  of  methodologies  for  formulating  and  testing  hypotheses:  the
appropriateness of a method depends on the chances that such a method has of answering the
question.  Indeed,  when  it  comes  to  answer  a  research  question,  some  methods  are
appropriate, some others are not. To illustrate, let's consider question (a). The aim of the study
is investigating the function of jealousy and surveys and cross-cultural studies constitute  –
among others – appropriate methods for finding an answer. On the other hand, it is unlikely
that using a cloud chamber helps to find an answer to this question.
In addition to constraining the choice of methods, research questions determine what a
legitimate answer is. Here is where the relation between research questions and fruitfulness
becomes clear. Not any sort of answer is good as a reply to a question. For instance, the
answer “Jealousy is one of the causes of  many stalking cases” to the question “What is the
function of jealousy in evolution?” does not constitute a proper answer. That answer fails to
address  the  specific aim  of  the  question,  namely  clarifying  the  evolutionary  history  of
jealousy. However, there is more to be discussed about the pertinence of answers. In a recent
paper, Elisabeth Lloyd clarifies this point. She claims that “asking different questions makes
contrasting classes of answers legitimate” and “each question carries with it an appropriate
8 See Bryman (2007) for a critique of the idea of research questions as fundamental factors for research 
design.
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class of possible answers unique to it, and distinct from other contrasting classes of answers”
(2015, 346). This means that research questions make some specific answers appropriate and
some others irrelevant. As a consequence, while some answers are considered and analysed,
others are ignored. This may negatively affect the development of research programs. Indeed,
as Lloyd argues, a problematic use of research questions “can lead us to miss what’s really
going on, therefore to scientific failure” (ibid.). By excluding some answers, questions can
constrain research and have an impact on the effective development of research programs. I
argue that some questions may perform better than others when it comes to make a program
fruitful. In the next section, a case study illustrates how the choice of research questions and
the specific way in which they are used may either undermine or stimulate the development
of programs.
Besides research questions, a good assessment of the fruitfulness of research programs
should consider a further component of their set of tools, namely the discovery heuristics.
These are the strategies used to formulate novel hypotheses. Heuristics guide, constrain, and
help scientists' imagination in the exploration of phenomena. They are not perfectly reliable
strategies affording scientists good hypotheses in any context. However, they are taken as
useful  techniques  to  approach  the  world  (Wimsatt  2007,  76).  Assessing  the  discovery
heuristics of a program, then, means evaluating its ability to produce epistemic goods.
What are the discovery heuristics that can make a program fruitful? Fruitful programs
use  reliable heuristics.  That  is,  the  pattern  suggested  by  the  heuristics  for  formulating
hypotheses  is  rigorous,  i.e.,  not  involving  defective  reasoning.  Reliable  heuristics  allow
scientists to formulate well-designed hypotheses. This does not mean that reliable heuristics
only  produce  hypotheses  that  turn  out  to  be  true.  Rather,  well-designed  hypotheses  are
testable hypotheses that have good chances to be true.  Moreover,  it  should be noted that
heuristics  producing  many novel  hypotheses  do  not  necessarily  make a  program fruitful.
Proliferation  of  hypotheses  is  not  a  mark  of  fruitfulness.  Rather,  it  may  indicate  the
sloppiness of programs.
The strategy for evaluating fruitfulness suggested in this paper makes it possible to
distinguish between fruitful programs and “creative-but-stagnating” programs. It permits to
draw a distinction between virtuous programs whose content grows and improves over time,
and vicious programs whose content may grow by producing many hypotheses, but does not
improve, i.e., programs that do not extend our understanding of the world. As mentioned,
proliferation of hypotheses does not necessarily constitute desirable development.
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To summarize, in this section I have presented the main accounts of fruitfulness and I
have introduced my explication of fruitfulness and a strategy to assess programs. In the next
pages, I provide an example unveiling the efficacy of this strategy.
3. Fruitfulness at Work: A Case Study
The adaptationist program is the leading research program in evolutionary psychology. It is
led by the Santa Barbara School, which involves David Buss, John Tooby, Leda Cosmides
and many others. In order to distinguish such a program from other programs, I refer to this
approach by using David Buller's notation (2005) “Evolutionary Psychology” with capital
letters.9 Evolutionary Psychology is committed to methodological adaptationism. In a seminal
paper,  Paul  Godfrey-Smith  distinguishes  various  kinds  of  adaptationism  and  defines
methodological adaptationism as the thesis that
“The best way for scientists to approach biological systems is to look for features of
adaptation and good design. Adaptation is a good “organizing concept” for evolutionary
research” (Godfrey-Smith 2001, 337).
Looking for  adaptations  is  the  most  efficient  strategy to  extend our  body of  knowledge.
Adaptations are the products of natural selection: traits that solved specific adaptive problems
faced  by  our  ancestors  in  the  Environment  of  Evolutionary  Adaptedness  (EEA).
Methodological adaptationism does not necessarily involve the assumption that adaptation is
the most widespread product of evolution. In other words, adaptationist programs are not
necessarily committed to  empirical adaptationism, i.e.,  the idea that  natural  selection has
caused most – if not all – of the psychological traits. In this view, adaptations are the primary,
omnipresent component of the biological world (Godfrey-Smith 2001, 336). Methodological
adaptationism, instead, does not tell anything about the actual composition of the biological
world.  Its  focus  is  the  best  way to  explore  it.  Starting  out  the  research  by focusing  on
adaptations is,  according to methodological  adaptationists,  the most effective and reliable
approach to understand the evolutionary origin of traits, regardless of the actual amount of
adaptations.10 As Cosmides and Tooby explain, methodological adaptationism is essential to
9 Machery and Barrett (2006) argue that any distinction made between the researches conducted in 
evolutionary psychology is problematic because they often share methodologies and topics. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to discuss this issue. However, the research discussed in this paper is the one committed 
to methodological adaptationism.
10 Methodological adaptationism comes both in a strong and a weak form. While strong methodological 
adaptationism sees the adaptationist strategy as the only successful approach for understanding evolution, 
weak methodological adaptationism pictures it as just one of the successful strategies (see Lewens 2009, 
169).
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Evolutionary Psychology: “if one is interested in uncovering intelligible organization in our
species-typical psychological architecture, discovering and describing its adaptations is the
place to begin” (1992, 55). 
Adaptationist  psychologists  have  proposed plenty of  hypotheses  to  explain a  wide
range of traits. They often stress the productivity of their  approach. Indeed, the praise of
adaptationism's ability to account for previously ignored phenomena and make discoveries is
a  leitmotif found  in  many papers  (e.g.  Lewis  et  al.  20017;  Buss  &  Schmitt  2011).  For
instance, Stephen Pinker (2002) claims that “in the study of humans, there are major spheres
of  human  experience  –  beauty,  motherhood,  kinship,  morality,  cooperation,  sexuality,
violence – in which evolutionary psychology provides the only coherent theory” (2002, 135).
Buss and Reeve mention this exceptional virtue of their approach:
“By any reasonable  standard,  evolutionary psychology has  discovered  an  impressive
array  of  empirically  documented  phenomena  that  were  not  discovered  by  prior
mainstream nonevolutionary psychologists” (2003, 849).
To prove that, Buss and Reeve provide a long list of phenomena explained by Evolutionary
Psychology, such as desire for sexual variety, stepchild abuse, and causes of divorce (ivi.,
850).
Prima  facie,  Evolutionary  Psychology  seems  to  be  an  extremely  fruitful  research
program. It is able to develop its content by suggesting many hypotheses that improve our
understanding of the evolutionary origin of psychological traits. Evolutionary Psychology is
portrayed as a constant blooming of new hypotheses and methodological adaptationism looks
like an exceptionally fruitful strategy. Psychologists  claim that their approach is so fruitful
because it  constitutes  the most  reliable  and non-arbitrary way to classify and understand
phenomena  (Buss  1995,  6).  Moreover,  they  argue  that  alternative  approaches  to  the
adaptationist program do not equal such a great triumph in extending our knowledge. In their
view, this  program has clearly shown its  complete dominance in developing evolutionary
psychology (Buss & Reeve 2003, 852).
Evolutionary  Psychology  has  also  been  criticized  because  of  its  astonishing
productivity.  Many  scholars  challenge  the  overuse  and  soundness  of  adaptationist
explanations (Richardson 2007). In their view, such a large amount of hypotheses would be a
sign of the unreliability and sloppiness of methodological adaptationism. So, is Evolutionary
Psychology  fruitful?  How  can  we  deal  with  this  criticism?  Let's  assess  Evolutionary
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Psychology's fruitfulness by analysing two components of its set of tools, namely its research
questions and discovery heuristics. 
3.1 Research questions in Evolutionary Psychology
What are the research questions guiding Evolutionary Psychology? Buss provides us with an
answer. The questions are:
“What is the nature of the psychological mechanisms that evolution by selection has
fashioned? Why do these mechanisms exist in the form that they do – what adaptive
problems did they arise to solve, or what are their functions?” (1995, 5).
The reference to natural selection and function makes it clear that these are  adaptationist
questions, which can be exemplified by the following question:
(AQ) What is the function of trait T?
Asking about the function of a trait means enquiring its evolutionary function. The question,
then,  revolves  around  adaptations.  Following  the  aforementioned  three  dimensions  of
research questions, it is possible to clarify some aspects of this question. The  focus of the
adaptationist  question  are  biological  traits.  Its  aim,  then,  is  gaining  knowledge  on  the
evolutionary origin of these traits.  Specifically,  the question addresses the role of natural
selection in the development of traits. Finally, the orientation of this question is adaptationist,
i.e., the starting point is assuming that the trait studied is an adaptation. Psychologists see
asking this question as the most helpful procedure to advance our understanding of the role of
evolution on psychological mechanisms. If the adaptationist question was not being used,
many discoveries would not be possible (Tooby & Cosmides 1994, 43).
Recently, Elisabeth Lloyd has criticized the use of adaptationist questions. She argues
that  such  questions  impoverish  the  quality  of  research  in  evolutionary  biology  and
psychology. In her view, the adaptationist questions as used in Evolutionary Psychology only
admits adaptive answers, namely answers involving functions and adaptations.
Question Answers
What is the function of the trait T? A: The function of this trait is F.
A: The function of this trait is G.
Etc.
Table 1. Adaptationist question and its answers (Lloyd 2015, 346).
This means that this strategy rules out other possible answers, i.e., answers involving 
nonadaptive forces. Indeed, Lloyd claims that Evolutionary Psychologists see adaptive and 
nonadaptive answers as mutually exclusive. In particular, they see nonadaptive hypotheses as 
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statistical nulls. They understand “the rejection of adaptive hypotheses as logically 
necessitated for consideration or acceptance of any nonadaptive hypothesis” (2015, 349). 
This is evident in the discussion of Evolutionary Psychology's methodology offered by Buss 
and colleagues (1998). They claim that when an adaptationist hypothesis is not supported by 
data, the following options are available to psychologists. First of all, researchers may want 
to check whether the tests have been done properly. Second, if the tests have been correctly 
done and the adaptationist hypothesis is just wrong, researchers can suggest alternative 
adaptationist hypotheses. Third, researchers may want to test non-adaptationist hypotheses. 
However, considering non-adaptationist hypotheses, Buss and colleagues argue, involves 
trying “to disconfirm all existing functional explanations” (1998, 544). This – Lloyd argues – 
is misunderstanding how evolution works. Several evolutionary factors can be involved in the
evolution of a trait, i.e., several answers can simultaneously account for a trait. The way 
Evolutionary Psychologists use the adaptationist question leads to ignore important 
evolutionary factors, such as byproducts, that need to be considered to provide an exhaustive 
analysis of phenomena. As a consequence, the power of this program to provide adequate 
explanations is undermined. Lloyd states that the fruitfulness of this inquiry improves with a 
different question: “What evolutionary factors may play a role in the form and structure of the
trait T?” (2015, 346).
Question Answers
What evolutionary factors may play a role in
the form and structure of the trait T?
A: This trait occurs in the population because it has the
function F, i.e., the trait is an adaptation.
A: This trait occurs in the population because it has the 
function G, i.e., the trait is an adaptation.
A: This trait occurs widely in this population because it 
is genetically linked to a trait that is highly adaptive in 
this species (genetic linkage or correlation).
A: This trait has its current form largely because of an 
ancestral pattern (phyletic inertia).
A: This trait has its current form and distribution 
because of pleiotropy with a trait that was under natural 
selection (pleiotropy or byproduct).
A: This trait has its current form and distribution 
because it is a byproduct or bonus of a trait that is 
strongly selected in the opposite sex in this species 
(byproduct or bonus of an adaptation).
A: This trait has its current form and distribution 
because of some combination of the above factors.
Etc.
Table 2. Evolutionary factors question and its answers (Lloyd 2015, 346).
Nonadaptive and adaptive answers here are not seen as mutually exclusive. Namely, the 
question does not demand a rejection of adaptive answers in order to make room for 
13
nonadaptive ones. While the adaptationist question underestimates the actual role of different 
factors in evolution, the evolutionary factors question allow for different kinds of explanation
and it is able then to better account for the complexity of evolution. The two questions differ 
in their orientations. The adaptationist question has an adaptationist orientation and sees 
assuming that a trait is an adaptation as the best strategy to study it. The evolutionary factors 
question, instead, does not make such an assumption and it involves a pluralistic 
methodology. This question makes it possible to offer a pool of stronger hypotheses that may 
enhance the fruitfulness of evolutionary psychology.
If Lloyd is right, the adaptationist question, as used in Evolutionary Psychology, may 
impede the desirable development of the program. In other words, the possibility of 
extending and improving the content is undermined by the use of a limiting question that 
ignores legitimate answers, namely answers that, because of the complexity of evolution, 
need to be considered. This means that by monopolizing the kind of answers pursued, the 
adaptationist question does not make Evolutionary Psychology a fruitful program. The use of 
this question may lead to what Philip Kitcher calls the “tyranny of the ignorant” (2003, 130). 
Kitcher argues that because of some moral, political background assumptions, some 
questions are often undervalued by scientists. The case study shows that important questions, 
such as the pluralistic one suggested by Lloyd, are ignored and this negatively affects the 
advancement of science. The tyranny of the adaptationist question in Evolutionary 
Psychology is not due to moral and political assumptions. Rather, it is attributable to the 
extreme confidence in the adaptationist approach as a reliable strategy to improve our 
understanding of the evolution of human psychology. That is, in this case the tyranny of the 
ignorant is due to methodological assumptions. 
3.2 Heuristics in Evolutionary Psychology
The second factor I suggest for analysing the fruitfulness of research programs are the 
discovery heuristics, namely the strategies for developing novel hypotheses.
Evolutionary Psychologists apply two main heuristics to suggest hypotheses, i.e., 
reverse engineering and adaptive thinking (Griffiths 1996, 514). Reverse engineering 
“involves working backwards from what we know of human psychological architecture, to 
what its evolutionary functions might have been in ancestral environments” (Durrant & Haig 
2010, 362). Scientists detect a human beings' trait and imagine its selective advantage for our 
ancestors. For instance, if they have data about marital jealousy, psychologists formulate a 
hypothesis that explains such a trait as a solution to an adaptive problem faced by our 
14
ancestors in EEA. When using adaptive thinking, instead, researchers conceive “the adaptive 
problems ancestral humans were likely to have faced and generate plausible accounts for the 
psychological mechanisms which would have evolved to solve them” (ibid.). That is, 
scientists imagine a particular adaptive problem in EEA, such as protecting one's own 
offspring, and they formulate a hypothesis concerning the existence of a certain adaptation 
solving that problem, such as jealousy. The products of these heuristics are adaptationist 
hypotheses, i.e., hypotheses that explain traits as adaptations. Indeed, both reverse 
engineering and adaptive thinking are adaptationist strategies that ascribe to natural selection 
the primary role in the explanation of traits. 
Evolutionary Psychologists have firmly defended the adequacy of these heuristics. 
They argue that, despite being a young field, Evolutionary Psychology has proven itself 
capable of suggesting plenty of evolutionary hypotheses and advancing our understanding of 
human psychology and that the adaptationist methodology has a crucial role in making this 
possible. For instance, Tooby and Cosmides claim that the adaptationist methodology “can 
free cognitive scientists from the blinders of intuition and folk psychology, allowing them to 
construct experiments capable of detecting complex mechanisms they otherwise would not 
have thought to test for” (1994, 41). Focusing on the evolutionary function of traits is seen as 
“an indispensable methodological tool, crucial to the future development of cognitive 
psychology” (ivi, 43). According to several evolutionary psychologists, this is exactly the 
purpose of Evolutionary Psychology. As David Schmitt and June Pilcher (2004) explain, 
psychologists take the view that “identifying all the psychological adaptations that make up 
human nature – the adaptationist program of humanity – is what evolutionary psychology 
should be all about (2004, 644). Recently, a group of Evolutionary Psychologists has 
published a guide for conducting research in Evolutionary Psychology (Lewis et al. 2017). In 
this guide, psychologists confirm their confidence in adaptive thinking and reverse 
engineering. Indeed, these heuristics are suggested as the appropriate, reliable methodological
tools for generating rigorous hypotheses (355).
Do these discovery heuristics make Evolutionary Psychology fruitful? As mentioned, 
fruitful programs use reliable heuristics, namely heuristics that avoid defective reasoning. 
Let's analyse the reasoning involved in reverse engineering and adaptive thinking.
Reverse engineering involves observing a current trait and inferring from it the 
adaptive problem that the trait possibly solved in EEA. Adaptive thinking involves first 
hypothesizing an adaptive problem faced in EEA, and then inferring from that the specific 
trait that was evolved to solve the problem. Both these heuristics assume “a strong 
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relationship between adaptive forces and the resulting organism” (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999, 
242). This assumption of optimality may hinder the formulation of well-designed hypotheses.
Formulating well-designed hypotheses on the evolutionary nature of psychological traits is 
not an elementary work. The evolution of traits involves several aspects that should be 
meticulously considered in the formulation of hypotheses. For instance, developmental and 
environmental factors do play a role in the evolution of traits by constraining the action of 
natural selection. Because of such a strong optimality assumption, it is not clear how these 
heuristics can account for these factors. As Paul Griffiths (2001) explains, the inferences 
allowed by these heuristics (i.e. inferring the adaptive problem from the solution and 
inferring the solution from the adaptive problem) are then unreliable. These heuristics may be
too imprecise to constitute reliable tools for formulating evolutionary hypotheses. This means
that they may constitute an obstacle to the development of the research program. Lewis and 
colleagues have recently argued that Psychologists do consider various evolutionary factors 
in the formulation of hypotheses, such as byproducts (2017, 362). However, whether the 
consideration of these factors is widespread as claimed should be assessed by means of a 
careful analysis of the hypotheses suggested by psychologists in their papers. In order to be 
accurate, the consideration of different evolutionary factors should be present in any 
evolutionary study of psychological traits.
Recently, Edouard Machery (2011) argued that although it might be true that the 
adaptationist heuristics may produce inaccurate hypotheses, this does not mean that they 
systematically do that. He claims that the adaptationist strategy may actually be beneficial, 
since it reduces the class of possible hypotheses. Why is this beneficial? Machery does not 
clarify the benefits of reducing the class of hypotheses. However, there are at least two 
reasons why this may be beneficial. First, it makes scientists' work easier. Having a restricted 
number of hypotheses to analyse makes it easier to find out what is the best hypothesis 
among them. Second, this strategy may be beneficial because it admits only the hypotheses 
that are worth considering. It rules out bad hypotheses, namely hypotheses that are likely to 
be false. One of the benefits of this strategy is then preventing proliferation of hypotheses.
In fact, these heuristics prevent the formulation of many hypotheses. Is this a virtue of 
the program? As mentioned above, these heuristics face the problem of focusing exclusively 
on adaptationist hypotheses and ignoring other kinds of evolutionary hypotheses, such as the 
ones involving byproducts. This means that they ignore plausible evolutionary hypotheses 
that need to be considered to reach an exhaustive analysis of the evolution of traits. This is 
not a desirable reduction of hypotheses. Moreover, these heuristics may actually multiply 
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hypotheses by suggesting too many adaptationist hypotheses, also the ones that are likely to 
be false but are considered because of their adaptationist nature. The adaptationist strategies, 
then, do not prevent the proliferation of hypotheses. They actually encourages it. By 
preventing the formulation of many legitimate evolutionary hypotheses, these strategies 
undermine the possibility to improve and extend our understanding of human psychology and
this is a problem for the fruitfulness of Evolutionary Psychology.
The discovery heuristics used in Evolutionary Psychology have what Gould calls 
“virtuosity in invention” (1978, 530). They are powerful tools enabling scientists to imagine 
scenarios explaining the existence of a trait and its evolutionary function. Still, because of the
unreliable inferences they allow, their ability to formulate well-designed hypotheses is 
undermined. Their power to develop Evolutionary Psychology is then limited.
3.3 Is Evolutionary Psychology fruitful?
The previous sections pinpoint the problems of the research question and heuristics used in 
Evolutionary Psychology. These problems constrain the power of the program to extend and 
improve the understanding of human psychology and, then, they compromise its fruitfulness. 
Still, there is room for improvement. 
The adaptationist question is not necessarily fruitless. For instance, in evolutionary 
medicine this question is used as a fruitful tool to improve our understanding of medical 
conditions and, in some cases, our ability to cure diseases (Nesse & Stearns 2008). The 
adaptationist question is just one of the evolutionary questions used to guide research in 
evolutionary medicine. Indeed, as Randolph Nesse and Stephen Strearns explain, research in 
evolutionary medicine involves both the adaptationist question “How has mechanism M 
given a selective advantage to individuals?” and the general evolutionary question “What is 
the phylogeny of this mechanism?” (Nesse & Stearns 2008, 30). Evolutionary Psychology, 
then, might improve its fruitfulness by employing a more pluralistic methodology, namely 
involving both adaptationist and non-adaptationist questions. The evolutionary factors 
question suggested by Lloyd seems to be a good option to improve Evolutionary 
Psychology's fruitfulness. Moreover, adaptationist heuristics are not doomed to failure in any 
context. By analysing research in evolutionary biology, Sara Green noticed that while 
methodological adaptationism may be a productive heuristic for some specific tasks, such as 
exploring the connections between causal capacities and selective pressures, it performs 
poorly for other tasks, such as studying drift (2014, 493). The same might be true for 
Evolutionary Psychology. It is then necessary to understand in which cases adaptationist 
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heuristics may be able to develop the program and in which cases they hinder the 
development. 
Psychologists often praise the fruitfulness of their program. They frequently provide 
lists of the successes of Evolutionary Psychology, such as new discoveries and theories (e.g. 
Buss & Reeve 2003). It is an open question whether all the items on these lists do constitute 
desirable development, i.e., extensions of our understanding of human psychology. Indeed, 
many of the discoveries and theories of the program have been criticized as being the 
products of poor scientific research, even the ones that are usually presented as triumphs of 
the program, such as the Sexual Strategies Theory suggested by Buss and Schmitt (1993). 
Evolutionary Psychology is a very creative program. Still, its research question and heuristics
compromise its fruitfulness. 
4. Conclusion 
I have argued that the traditional accounts of fruitfulness are too vague to provide a strategy 
to assess the fruitfulness of research programs. I have suggested a new approach, which is 
focused on analysing the set of tools used by scientists to extend and improve the content of a
program. Specifically, this approach focuses on examining research questions and discovery 
heuristics.
What does the analysis of questions and heuristics tell us about research programs? 
What does fruitfulness reveal about research programs? To answer this question, it is useful 
to recall the traditional distinction between epistemic and cognitive values (e.g. Laudan 
2004). While epistemic values are truth indicative features of programs and inform us about 
their truth value, cognitive values do not tell anything about the truth value of programs, but 
are valuable for pragmatic reasons, such as making research easier and faster. If this 
distinction holds, what kind of value is fruitfulness? Some philosophers argue that it is an 
epistemic value (McMullin 1983), while others claim it is a cognitive value (Kuhn 1977; 
Douglas 2009). I argue that fruitfulness is a cognitive value. More precisely, fruitfulness is 
one of the values that Daniel Steel calls extrinsic epistemic values, i.e., values promoting “the
attainment of truth without themselves being indicators or requirements of truth” (Steel 2010,
18). Fruitfulness is a relevant value because it is an essential virtue of scientific research 
programs, which have to be able to develop and improve our understanding or knowledge of 
the world. Moreover, fruitfulness may facilitate the fulfilment of other values. Using research
questions that permit an exhaustive analysis of phenomena and heuristics that enable 
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scientists to formulate well-designed hypotheses promote the fulfilment of values like 
predictive power, scope, and explanatory power. Nonetheless, the fact that programs use 
reliable methods does not inform us about their truth value.  
Despite having an explication of fruitfulness and a strategy to assess it, scientists' 
assessment of programs may still clash with each other. For instance, scientists may disagree 
on which research questions are more reliable. Nonetheless, having precise criteria – such as 
questions and heuristics – provides the basis for unambiguous and useful debates. As noticed 
in the second section, the accounts of fruitfulness suggested in the literature are too vague to 
do this. The strategy to assess fruitfulness suggested in this paper makes it possible to avoid 
several disputes over the merits of programs: to be fruitful, programs have to use suitably 
detailed research questions and reliable discovery heuristics.
Various factors may contribute to the fruitfulness of programs, such as local 
contingencies and the skills of scientists. For instance, the funds available to programs and 
scientists' competence can contribute to determine the development of programs. Hence, 
considering these aspects may be important for an accurate assessment of the fruitfulness of 
programs. 
In this paper, I explicated fruitfulness as the power of programs to develop. Moreover, 
I suggested a strategy to assess the fruitfulness of programs. This analysis may be developed 
further by examining other tools that can be used to improve and extend the content of 
programs, such as the methodologies to test hypotheses and predictions. However, the 
explication and strategy I suggest constitute a starting point for a serious discussion of the 
actual relevance of fruitfulness in the assessment of research programs. 
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